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In re: A.W.
Quote from Judge Zayas:
Mother has eight children, all of whom have been the subject of this juvenile court case at one point and none of which are in her care. Only one of her children, A.W., is the subject of this appeal. Mother’s oldest child was removed from her care in 2014 due to allegations of abuse which included mother beating the child with her hands, extension cords, boards, and other household objects, and holding a knife to his throat. In 2015, HCJFS sought temporary custody of mother’s six other children due in part to continued physical fights between mother and her second oldest child, mother telling the child to hide the “whoppings” and to hide any injuries under her clothes, and mother admitting to physical discipline of the children. After adjudication, the child involved in the physical fights with mother was placed in the temporary custody of HCJFS while mother’s five other children remained in her care under protective supervision.
The protective supervision continued until HCJFS filed a complaint for temporary custody of those children in July 2016, asserting that mother had physically abused her third oldest child by whipping him with a cable wire, choking him, pushing him against a wall, and hitting him in the face approximately six times. The complaint also asserted that the child had visible injuries to his lip and a bump on his forehead, and alleged that mother admitted to hitting the child with a belt and said that she believed she had the right to parent however she wanted to.
SUMMARY: The trial court’s best-interest determination was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), the burden was on mother to prove that she could provide a legally secure placement for the child and the record showed that she failed to present any evidence to prove that the condition upon which the child was removed had been remedied.
State of Ohio v. Marcus Mitchell
Quote from Judge Bock:
At trial, the state established, through text messages and testimony from the rape survivor (“C.L.”), that Mitchell, under the guise of seeking help with a college project, had invited C.L. to an apartment on Stratford Avenue near the University of Cincinnati on homecoming night. A friend dropped off C.L. at the address provided by Mitchell. Mitchell accompanied her to what appeared to be a dorm room. Mitchell was upset over some personal items missing from his room and, over the next few hours, came and went from the room, leaving her alone. During his final disappearance, C.L. fell asleep.
C.L. testified that she was awakened by a phone call around 10:00 p.m. It was Mitchell, warning her that the police were on their way, and she needed to leave. In a text message, he told her to walk to an address on Riddle Road. Later, he told her to cut behind the back of a building on Clifton Avenue. Her phone died shortly thereafter. She looked in her purse for a bus pass or money, but they were gone. According to C.L., she cut through the parking lot behind the building as suggested by Mitchell when she was tackled from behind. C.L. identified Mitchell as the assailant.
SUMMARY: The state’s evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) when testimony from the rape survivor and examining nurse, the sexual assault examination report, and DNA-test results established that defendant compelled the rape survivor to engage in sexual conduct through force.
The evidence produced at trial weighed heavily in support of defendant’s conviction for rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) where the rape survivor’s testimony was credible and corroborated by testimony from the nurse who examined her, the sexual-assault-examination report, and the physical evidence produced at trial, and any inconsistencies in the survivor’s testimony were inconsequential.
In re: C & C Children
Quote from Judge Myers:
Grandmother initially petitioned for custody of the children in 2015 and obtained legal custody of them in 2016. At the time, the children were ages eight, seven, and six years old.
Two years later, in September 2018, HCJFS obtained interim custody of the children after grandmother was arrested for child endangering involving the oldest child, as well as obstructing official business. HCJFS filed a complaint for temporary custody.
The children’s father has never participated in the proceedings. Their mother appeared with counsel at some points, but eventually informed the magistrate on the record that she was not seeking the return of the children to her care. Grandmother participated in some of the proceedings but failed to appear at a February 2019 adjudication-and-disposition hearing.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying grandmother’s motion for legal custody of the minor children and granting permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s findings that an award of permanent custody was in the children’s best interest.
Clifford Lawton Daly, Jr. v. Bruce Rowe, Coating Applications, Inc., Coating Applications LLC, Coating Applications International LLC, Kathy R. Daly, Quality Composites, Inc.
Quote from Judge Myers:
Bruce Rowe and Clifford Daly were business partners for years until their relationship dissolved in 2018. Daly brought suit against Rowe when he was locked out of the business, and these appeals follow the trial court’s determination of claims between the parties. Both plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant Clifford Daly and defendants-appellants/cross-appellees Bruce Rowe, Coating Applications, Inc., Coating Applications LLC, and Coating Applications International LLC (collectively
referred to as “defendants”), 1 appeal from the trial court’s entry following a bench trial finding in favor of Daly on his claim for breach of fiduciary duty and awarding him damages.
In these appeals, we are asked to determine whether Daly had standing to pursue a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Rowe or whether that claim had to be brought derivatively on behalf of the shareholders of the close corporation that Daly and Rowe had formed. If we find that Daly had a viable individual claim, we must then review the trial court’s award of damages. We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting judgment to Daly individually on his claim for breach of fiduciary duty. But we further find that the trial court’s award of damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We accordingly reverse the trial court’s award of damages and remand this case for further proceedings.
Where the shareholder plaintiff of a close corporation suffered an injury separate and distinct from the corporation, the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff had standing to bring a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Where plaintiff introduced evidence regarding the corporation’s annual sales and profit margins, as well as the percentage of profits received by the shareholders, for a five-year period preceding the events leading to the current litigation, and also introduced evidence regarding the corporation’s sales following the event that precipitated the litigation, the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving damages.
JUDGMENT: Affirmed IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED