State v. Tidwell, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2072
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County to the Supreme Court of Ohio
Quote from Judge Donnelly's Opinion:
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures does not forbid a police officer from initiating a brief investigatory stop of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. In this case, the issue is whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain appellee, Sherry Tidwell, in order to confirm or dispel an unidentified witness’s assertion that Tidwell was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Based on the totality of the circumstances then confronting the officer, we hold that his investigatory stop of Tidwell was reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals that upheld the Hamilton County Municipal Court’s order granting Tidwell’s motion to suppress, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Blue Tide Partners, LLC v. Andre Bonner
Quote from Judgment Entry:
Defendant-appellant Andre Bonner appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding his former landlord, plaintiff-appellee Blue Tide Partners, LLC, (“Blue Tide”) $1575 in past due rent and late fees.
At the trial, Blue Tide claimed that Bonner’s rent was $600 per month but Bonner argued that the rent under the original lease agreement was $500 per month. Bonner claimed that he was paying an additional $100 monthly in anticipation that he would be responsible for replacing the carpet at the end of his lease term.
Blue Tide initiated eviction proceedings after Bonner had failed to pay rent in January and February of 2019. Because Bonner did not return the apartment keys until March 2019, Blue Tide sought rent for that month as well. Bonner testified at trial that he had twice attempted to return the keys but no one from Blue Tide met him at the apartment. Further, he indicated that there was no drop box or other place to leave the keys.
In re: R.B.
Quote from Judge Bergeron's Opinion: In this remand of a juvenile case from the Ohio Supreme Court, we address four assignments of error that we previously deemed moot. Defendantappellant R.B. challenges the trial court’s decision to perpetuate his status as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant on jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive grounds. After a thorough review of the record and extant authorities, we find R.B.’s arguments unavailing and affirm the judgments of the juvenile court.
These appeals are the product of a winding procedural posture that stretches back nearly a decade. In October 2011, R.B. (then 14 years old) admitted in juvenile court to committing sexual-related acts with his two four-year-old cousins, acts which if committed by an adult would have constituted two counts of gross sexual imposition (felonies of the fourth degree). Pursuant to two December 2, 2011 orders and the addendum to one of those orders, R.B. was committed to the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) until age 21. The court suspended R.B.’s commitment, placed him probation, and ordered him to complete a residential treatment program at Altercrest. Notably, the court suspended R.B.’s commitment on the express condition that he “obey all laws and orders of this Court.”
Irene Danopulos v. American Trading II, LLC
Quote from Judge Bergeron's Opinion:
A robbery, a fistful of jewels, and a pawnshop provide the backdrop to this long-running dispute, which now reaches our court for the third time. The victim of the robbery sued the pawnshop that bought her jewelry from the thief (before reselling it to someone else) for conversion, and the question before us implicates the propriety of the damage award issued by the trial court. After a comprehensive review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s damage award in part, but reverse and remand on the issue of damages for the plaintiff’s diamond bracelet.
The roots of this case stretch back to 2014, when a group of thieves burglarized the Dayton-area home of Irene Danopulos. The thieves seized several pieces of valuable jewelry, then sold three of the stolen items—an emerald ring, a brooch, and a diamond bracelet—to American Trading II, LLC, a Cincinnati pawn shop. American Trading retained the jewelry for the requisite 15-day period, then sold it for scrap to a third party. See R.C. 4727.12(A). By the time that the detective working on Mrs. Danopulos’s case traced the jewelry to American Trading, all three pieces had already been destroyed and alienated. Mrs. Danopulos accordingly sued for conversion.
State of Ohio v. Akmal Abdullaev
Quote from Judge Hendon's Opinion:
Defendant-appellant Akmal Abdullaev entered guilty pleas to five counts of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor. The trial court sentenced him to 18 months for each count. The trial court ordered counts one and two to be served consecutively. The sentences in counts three, four and five were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts one and two, for a total of 36 months in prison.
Abdullaev now appeals, asserting in a single assignment of error, that his sentence is contrary to law. Because the trial court did not make all of the required findings prior to imposing consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing, we sustain Abdullaev’s assignment of error.
Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may only modify or vacate a defendant’s sentence “if we ‘clearly and convincingly find’ that either (1) the record does not support the mandatory sentencing findings, or (2) that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law.’ ” State v. White, 2013-Ohio-4225, 997 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.); State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 7.
State of Ohio v. Immanuel Billings
Quote from Judge Myers' Opinion:
The state of Ohio appeals the judgments of the Hamilton County Municipal Court granting defendant-appellee Immanuel Billings’s motion to suppress. Because the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress based on grounds that were not raised in the motion and that were beyond the scope of the motion as stipulated by Billings at the suppression hearing, and because the trial court erred in concluding that there was no probable cause to arrest Billings, we reverse.
Billings was charged with obstructing official business and resisting arrest during a traffic stop where he was the passenger of a vehicle driven by his mother. He filed a motion to suppress in which he asserted that police did not have probable cause to arrest him for obstructing official business.
At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel stipulated that his motion was limited to the lack of probable cause to arrest:
THE COURT: Are there any stipulations or anything you want to put on the record? What’s being disputed in terms of the stop and the arrest? What - - [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No probable cause, your Honor. THE COURT: No PC to arrest. DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
The parties stipulated that Billings’s arrest was a warrantless arrest
State of Ohio v. James Marshall
Quote from Judgment Entry:
Defendant-appellant James Marshall presents on appeal a single assignment of error challenging the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court’s judgment denying his “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction with Inherent Power.” We affirm the court’s judgment as modified to dismiss the motion.
Marshall was convicted in 2006 upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of murder, involuntary manslaughter, and drug trafficking and possession, as charged in consolidated indictments. He unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on direct appeal and in postconviction motions filed in 2006 and 2010. State v. Marshall, 175 Ohio App.3d 488, 2008-Ohio-955, 887 N.E.2d 1227 (1st Dist.), appeal not allowed, 118 Ohio St.3d 1510, 2008-Ohio- 3369, 889 N.E.2d 1027; State v. Marshall, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-080385 (Jan. 28, 2009); State v. Marshall, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070054 (Dec. 19, 2009); State v. Marshall, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110054 (Dec. 9, 2011).
State of Ohio v. Ronald Thompson
Quote from Judgment Entry:
Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant Ronald Thompson was convicted of making an improper change of course under Cincinnati Municipal Code 506.80 and failing to stop after an accident under R.C. 4549.02. We find no merit in his sole assignment of error, and we affirm his convictions.
In his sole assignment of error, Thompson contends that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues that the evidence showed that he was not the driver of the car involved in the accident, and instead showed that his son was the driver. This assignment of error is not well taken.
State of Ohio v. Maurice Brown
Quote from Judge Zayas' Opinion:
The state of Ohio appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court granting defendant-appellee Maurice Brown’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after a stop and search of his vehicle. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
On April 17, 2019, Maurice Brown was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Brown filed a motion to suppress the paraphernalia arguing that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of his vehicle and the length of the detention after the stop to await a drug sniffing canine.
At the hearing on the motion, the sole witness was Officer Sullivan. Sullivan testified that he was working as an undercover police officer for the Cincinnati Police Department on April 17, 2019. Sullivan had been an officer for 13 years and had spent the past two years with “Violent Crimes.” He received extensive training in drug interdiction and drug-trafficking operations by the Desert Snow Black Asphalt Company. Sullivan was trained to recognize signs and signals of drug trafficking.
State of Ohio, ex rel. Delta Lookout, LLC, Delev and Associates, LLC v. City of Cincinnati, John Cranley, Mayor of the City of Cincinnati, John Brazina, Director of Transportation and Engineering for the City of Cincinnati
Quote from Judge Zayas' Opinion:
This action is before us on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court. Relators seek a writ of mandamus compelling the city of Cincinnati to repair and maintain two streets located within the community of Mt. Lookout, Willbarre Terrace and Close Court (“the streets”). R.C. 723.01 imposes a duty upon a municipal corporation to care for, supervise, and control public streets. In State ex rel. Delta Lookout, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati, 162 Ohio St.3d 494, 2020-Ohio-5486, 165 N.E.3d 1256, ¶ 25, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the streets were statutorily dedicated as public streets as of 1876. Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandamus, ordering respondent the city of Cincinnati to care for, supervise, and control Willbarre Terrace and Close Court in accordance with its duty under R.C. 723.01. However, we decline to issue any order regarding relators’ claims for damages as we find that relators have an adequate remedy in the course of law in regard to those claims.
Relators Delta Lookout, LLC, and Delev and Associates, LLC, are businesses operating in a building located in the Mt. Lookout area of the city of Cincinnati (“the city”). Relators filed an original action in mandamus with this court seeking an order to compel the city and its officials to repair and maintain the streets. After both sides filed motions for summary judgment, this court issued an opinion declining to issue a writ after finding that the city did not have a duty to maintain the streets because the streets were not public streets. State ex rel. Delta Lookout, LLC v. City of Cincinnati, 2019-Ohio-5353, 150 N.E.3d 556, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.). Relators appealed this court’s decision, and the Ohio Supreme Court reversed it, finding the streets to be statutorily dedicated public streets. Delta Lookout at ¶ 25. In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court remanded this matter to this court to fully apply the mandamus standard and determine whether relators have satisfied all the necessary requirements to be entitled to the writ they seek. Id. at ¶ 27.
In accordance with the Ohio Supreme Court’s order of remand, on February 24, 2021, this court ordered the parties to submit briefing on the issues remanded to this court. Relators and respondents complied with this court’s order and submitted briefs. The case was submitted on the briefs. We now address whether relators are entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the city to maintain and repair the streets.