Friday First District Roundup 12-13-19

Each Friday, we highlight decisions of the First District Court of Appeals in the past week. For question about these cases, contact Vanessa Seeger.

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In re: L.D.
Case #C190470

Quote from Judge Crouse's Opinion:

Mother has appealed from the trial court’s entry granting permanent custody of her child L.D. to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“JFS”). In one assignment of error, she argues that JFS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it should be awarded permanent custody of L.D. We overrule mother’s assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Damiel Louder, Barbara M. Louder v. Sharon Woods Park, Great Parks of Hamilton County, Board of Park Commissioner of Hamilton County, Ohio, Great Parks of Hamilton County Rangers, et.al
Case # C190052

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Plaintiff-appellants Daniel and Barbara M. Louder filed a negligence complaint against defendants-appellees Sharon Woods Park, Great Parks of Hamilton County, and Board of Park Commissioners of Hamilton County (collectively “Great Parks”).

Daniel Louder attended a steak fry at Lakeside Lodge in Sharon Woods Park. He was injured after he tripped over a large block of stone referred to as a “hearth” as he exited from a restroom. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Great Parks based on the doctrines of governmental and recreational-use immunity. The Louders filed a timely appeal from the trial court’s judgment. In their sole assignment of error, the Louders contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Great Parks. They argue that issues of fact exist as to whether appellees are entitled to governmental immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 and recreational-use immunity under R.C. 1533.18.

State of Ohio v. J.D. Cauthen, Jr.
Case #C180660

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Defendant-appellant J.D. Cauthen appeals his conviction for domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). In one assignment of error, he argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We overrule his assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

State of Ohio v. Michael Barnes
Case # C180637

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Defendant-appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of trafficking in heroin (count one), a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs (count three), a felony of the third degree. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to 18 months on count one and 36 months on count three, to be served concurrently with each other. Appellant’s appointed counsel has advised this court that, after a thorough review of the record, he can find nothing that would arguably support appellant’s appeal, and that the appeal is wholly frivolous.

Jamie Owens v. Eric Owens
Case #C190036

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Plaintiff-appellant Jamie Owens appeals the trial court’s entry upholding the magistrate’s decision and granting third-party Sandra Sargee’s motion for contempt. In two assignments of error, Owens argues that the finding of contempt was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the trial court failed to consider the best-interest factors under R.C. 3109.051(D).

We review a trial court’s decision to hold a party in contempt for an abuse of discretion. Wolf v. Wolf, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090587, 2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 4. “A prima facie case of civil contempt is made when the moving party proves both the existence of a court order and the nonmoving party’s noncompliance with the terms of that order.” Id. If a prima facie case of civil contempt is made, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish a defense for its noncompliance. Id.

In re: T.K.M.
Case #C190020

Quote from Judge Mock's Opinion:

Appellant father appeals the decision of the Hamilton County Juvenile Court granting custody of his daughter T.K.M. to J.C., the child’s step-aunt. We find no merit in his sole assignment of error, and we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

Chanel M. Holloman v. Permanent General Assurance Corporation, d.b.a. The General, Trustgard Insurance Company
Case # C180692

Quote from Judge Winkler's Opinion:

Plaintiff-appellant Chanel Holloman appeals the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Permanent General Assurance Corporation, d.b.a. The General (“The General”), and Trustgard Insurance Company (“Trustgard”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Trustgard, and we affirm the judgment entered in favor of The General.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

Holloman was injured in a car crash by a car driven by Christopher Hay. Hay was driving a Chrysler Sebring owned by his then-girlfriend Bethany Mathis. Mathis had an insurance policy with The General in which she had insured the Sebring. At the time of the crash, Hay had an auto liability policy with Trustgard. Hay’s Trustgard policy listed a 1998 Cadillac Deville as a covered automobile. Hay had sold the Cadillac approximately four months prior to the collision.

State of Ohio v. Toby Arzman
Case # C180639

Quote from Judgment Entry:

In one assignment of error, defendant-appellant Toby Arszman challenges the trial court’s October 29, 2018 judgment, entered nunc pro tunc to February 22, 2013, which classified him as a Tier I sex offender under R.C. Chapter 2950, Ohio’s version of the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”). Arszman argues that the trial court erred in classifying him as a Tier I sex offender and imposing Tier I sex-offender registration requirements on him after he had served his prison sentence for the sex offense and had been released.

State of Ohio v. Robert Day
Case #C190006

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Defendant-appellant’s appointed counsel has advised this court that, after a thorough review of the record, he can find nothing that would arguably support appellant’s appeal, and that the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see also Freels v. Hills, 843 F.2d 958 (6th Cir.1988). Counsel, as required by Anders, has communicated this conclusion to appellant, and has offered appellant an opportunity to respond and to raise any issues. Counsel has also moved this court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders at 744; see also 1st Dist. Loc.R. 16.2(C)(1) and 16.2(D)(2).

State of Ohio v. Joseph Marshall
Case #C180673

Quote from Judgment Entry:

In his sole assignment of error, defendant-appellant Joseph Marshall appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred in excessively sentencing him because the record did not support the sentence. This court reviews sentences under the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

Under that standard, an appellate court “may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016- Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1. A trial court need not make specific findings, and we can presume the court considered the statutory factors absent an affirmative demonstration in the record showing otherwise. See State v. Robinson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150602, 2016-Ohio-5114, ¶ 6.

State of Ohio v. Chris Kramer
Case #C180667

Quote from Judgment Entry:

The judgment entry appealed from indicates that defendant-appellant Chris Kramer was found guilty of receiving stolen property following a jury trial even though the record plainly demonstrates that Kramer had not requested a jury trial but had instead entered a plea of guilty. We note that the trial court retains jurisdiction to correct this clerical error on the judgment entry.

Kramer’s appointed counsel has advised this court that, after a thorough review of the record, he can find nothing that would arguably support appellant’s appeal, and that the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see also Freels v. Hills, 843 F.2d 958 (6th Cir.1988). Counsel, as required by Anders, has communicated this conclusion to appellant, and has offered appellant an opportunity to respond and to raise any issues. Counsel has also moved this court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders at 744; see also 1st Dist. Loc.R. 16.2(C)(1) and 16.2(D)(2).

State of Ohio v. Vince Dye
Case #C180624

Quote from Judge Bergeron's Opinion:

Confronted with an erroneous sexual offender classification from nearly two decades ago that it did not appeal, the state sought to reach back and modify that decision by declaring it “void.” But just because a trial judge might make a mistake, that does not render the decision “void.” The state attempts to justify this result as stemming from a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but that would be a dangerous proposition for us to entertain. The trial court certainly had underlying subject matter jurisdiction here, and the state cannot dust off the decision many years later and question the result unless it follows the well-trod path of seeking post-judgment relief. Nevertheless, a successor trial court granted the state’s request and changed the classification, but it lacked authority to do so, which accordingly requires us to reverse its amended sentencing entry.