Friday First District Roundup 11/25/19

Each Friday, we highlight decisions of the First District Court of Appeals in the past week. For question about these cases, contact Vanessa Seeger.

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The Retirement Corporation of America, Fifth Third Bank v. David B. Henning, Formidable Asset Management
Case #C180643

Quote from Judge Myers' Opinion:

The Retirement Corporation of America (“RCA”) and Fifth Third Bank appeal the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas dismissing their action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with prospective business relationships, and spoliation of evidence against RCA’s former employee, David B. Henning, and Henning’s new employer, Formidable Asset Management (“Formidable”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the breach-ofcontract claim and reverse its judgment dismissing the remaining claims.

State of Ohio v. Treshon Glover
Case # C180696

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Defendant-appellant Treshon Glover pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) and one count of aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), each with an accompanying firearm specification. The trial court sentenced Glover to three years’ imprisonment on each of the two felonies, to run concurrently to each other. It also imposed the mandatory three-year prison term on each of the two firearm specifications, to run consecutively to each other and the three year term on the underlying felonies, for a total prison term of nine years.

In his sole assignment of error, Glover contends that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the two firearm specifications. He argues that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings to justify the consecutive sentences as required by former R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and that the underlying felonies were part of the same act or transaction. This assignment of error is not well taken.

State of Ohio v. Alphonso Goodwin
Case #C180666

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Alphonso Goodwin appeals his conviction, following his guilty plea, of aggravated robbery with an accompanying firearm specification. In a single assignment of error, he argues that his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a guilty plea, the defendant must meet the two-prong test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Hill at 57; Xie at 524. Second, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty * * *.” Hill at 59; Xie at 524.

Jane Moore v. Jessica Hodge, Isaac Hodge, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Elias Tsbouris, Julie Eichstadt, Humana Insurance Company
Case # C180633

Quote from Judge Zayas' Opinion:

Plaintiff-appellant Jane Moore appeals the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees Isaac and Jessica Hodge and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company and dismissing her complaint based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The court determined that Moore was estopped from bringing the claims because she failed to disclose the claims in her bankruptcy filings. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In re: P.R.
Case #C180167

Quote from Judge Zayas' Opinion:

P.R. appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of his motions to withdraw his admissions and vacate his adjudications and his petition for declassification. P.R. contends that his admissions to conduct that would have constituted rape and gross sexual imposition, if committed by an adult, should have been set aside because the juvenile court did not advise him that his admissions could have immigration consequences as required by R.C. 2943.031. He further argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his request to be reclassified as a Tier I juvenile offender registrant. Finding his assignments of error without merit, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgments.

In 2008, when P.R. was 14 years old, he admitted that he engaged in sexual conduct and sexual contact with a seven-year-old girl. P.R. was given suspended commitments, placed on probation, ordered to attend the residential program at Hillcrest, and classified a Tier III sex offender. At the end-of-disposition hearing, the juvenile court reclassified him a Tier II sexual offender.

Gina L. Watson v. Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Ohio Medical Transports, LLC, Omni Transports, LLC
Case #C180699

Quote from Judgment Entry:

Plaintiff-appellant Gina L. Watson appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas affirming the decision of the State of Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission (the “Commission”) to disallow her application for unemployment compensation. The Commission disallowed Watson’s application after determining that she was discharged by her former employer, Ohio Medical Transport, LLC, a private ambulance service, for just cause in connection with her employment. In two assignment of error, Watson argues that the trial court erred in affirming the Commission’s decision.

In re: J.C.
Case # C180479

Quote from Judge Zayas's Opinion:

Following a bench trial before a magistrate, 17-year-old J.C. was adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that had he been an adult would have constituted carrying a concealed weapon. In this appeal, J.C. challenges the stop that led to the charges against him. We conclude that the police officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot at the time J.C. was stopped, and therefore, the evidence that was discovered as a result of the stop should have been suppressed. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment.