Friday First District Roundup 10-8-21

State of Ohio v. Rico Mosley 
Case # C200448
Quote from Judge Bergeron's Opinion:
A minor traffic stop yielded drug evidence, which eventually led to a conviction. But when questioned by the driver, the detaining officer could not even describe the traffic violation that prompted the stop. After the driver’s indictment for drug possession, he moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the police officer lacked probable cause to make the stop. The trial court agreed, and this appeal followed. We reverse, holding that the stop was justified because the detaining officer effectuated the stop in reliance on a radio broadcast from another officer who witnessed the driver’s traffic offense.
I.
This case involves a purportedly unconstitutional traffic stop and the evidence discovered during that stop. It arises from an undercover officer’s surveillance of a highdrug area of Price Hill in September 2019. She observed defendant-appellee Rico Mosley’s vehicle stopped in the middle of traffic while he spoke with the occupants of an adjacent car. The undercover officer radioed a uniformed officer, Officer Merlin Murrell, asking him to stop Mr. Mosley for impeding traffic, although she also suspected Mr. Mosley’s involvement in drug activity.
After committing the traffic offense, Mr. Mosley pulled away, prompting the undercover officer to follow his car until the uniformed officer could arrive. During this journey, the undercover officer observed Mr. Mosley “making all kinds of movement as if to hide something,” facts that she conveyed to Officer Murrell as he was en route. He eventually caught up and pulled Mr. Mosley over. 

State of Ohio v. William Antonio Smith 
Case #C200366
Quote from Judge Crouse's Opinion:
Defendant-appellant William Antonio Smith appeals the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court’s judgment denying his “Motion for Subpoena of Hospital Records and Jail Phone Conversations Between Defendant and Counsel.” We affirm the court’s judgment.
Procedural Posture
In 2017, Smith was convicted on two counts of murder and a single count of having weapons while under a disability. He unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on direct appeal and in a petition under R.C. 2953.21 for postconviction relief. See State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170028, 2018-Ohio-2504, appeals not accepted, 154 Ohio St.3d 1444, 2018-Ohio-4962, 113 N.E.3d 553; State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190162, 2020-Ohio-1370.
In February 2019, Smith filed an application for DNA testing. The common pleas court denied the application in August 2019, and Smith appealed.
That appeal, in the case numbered C-190558, was still pending, 1 when, in August 2020, Smith filed with the common pleas court his “Motion for Subpoena of Hospital Records and Jail Phone Conversations Between Defendant and Counsel.” The common pleas court denied that motion in September 2020. This appeal followed. 

State of Ohio v. D'Jango Hendrix 
Case #C190702
Quote from Judge Zayas' Opinion:
Defendant-appellant D’Jango Hendrix appeals the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court’s judgments dismissing his “Motion for Postconviction Relief R.C. 2953.21-.23 [and] Motion for Relief of Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)” and his “Motion to Make the State’s Physical Evidence Available for Inspection and Testing.” We affirm the dismissal of his postconviction petition. And we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction his appeal from the dismissal of his “Motion to Make the State’s Physical Evidence Available for Inspection and Testing.”
Procedural Posture
In 2015, for his role in a shoot-out following a neighborhood gathering, Hendrix was convicted upon jury verdicts finding him guilty on four counts of attempted murder and a single count of having weapons while under a disability. He unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on direct appeal and in a petition under R.C. 2953.21 for postconviction relief. See State v. Hendrix, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-150194 and C-150200, 2016-Ohio-2697, appeals not accepted, 146 Ohio St.3d 1504, 2016-Ohio-5792, 58 N.E.3d 1175; State v. Hendrix, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C160887, 2018-Ohio-3754, appeal not accepted, 156 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2019-Ohio2261, 123 N.E.3d 1036.
In 2019, Hendrix filed a single document titled “Motion for Postconviction Relief R.C. 2953.21-.23 [and] Motion for Relief of Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B).” In that motion, Hendrix sought relief from his convictions under the postconviction statutes, R.C. 2953.21 et seq., or in the alternative, Civ.R. 60(B). The common pleas court reviewed the motion under the postconviction statutes and dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Three days later, Hendrix filed a “Motion to Make the State’s Physical Evidence Available for Inspection and Testing.” The common pleas court dismissed that motion as moot. These appeals followed.

Dr. Michael D. Wigton v. University of Cincinnati Physicians, Inc 
Case #C210305
Quote from Judge Bergeron's Opinion:
This noncompete dispute arises between a Cincinnati-based hand surgeon, plaintiff-appellant Dr. Michael Wigton, and his former employer, defendant-appellee University of Cincinnati Physicians, Inc. (“UCP”). Although this case poses questions about the enforceability of Dr. Wigton’s noncompete provision under Ohio law, the issue we confront today is whether the trial court applied the appropriate standard to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Given the procedural posture of this case, the trial court should have applied the familiar summary judgment standard, but it instead improperly elevated the burden on Dr. Wigton, requiring him to prove entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence. We accordingly reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Fresh out of medical school, Dr. Wigton entered an employment agreement with UCP in January 2016, which contained a noncompete provision. The noncompete prevents Dr. Wigton from practicing medicine, performing procedures, or rendering professional services in his specialty within ten miles of any location where he worked within the preceding 12 months. The noncompete lasts for 18 months following the termination of his employment. After four years with UCP, Dr. Wigton left for the greener pastures of Beacon Orthopedics and Sports Medicine (“Beacon”). 

Greg Gilman v. Physna, LLC, Physna, Inc., d.b.a. Physna, LLC 
Case #C200457
Quote from Judge Bock's Opinion:
Plaintiff-appellant Greg Gilman sued defendants-appellees Physna LLC and Physna, Inc., d.b.a. Physna LLC (“Physna”), asserting that Physna breached the parties’ contract when it failed to provide payments based on Physna’s profits. Physna denied liability, attached financial records to its answer, and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C). The trial court granted Physna’s motion and dismissed Gilman’s claims. Gilman now appeals that dismissal.
Because the trial court erroneously considered the financial records attached to Physna’s answer, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Gilman’s breach-of-contract and breach-of-good-faith claims. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Gilman’s unjust-enrichment claim.
I. Facts and Procedure
Physna is a data recognition and security company. In 2016, Gilman accepted an offer from the then start-up company to work as a developer. Gilman and Physna signed an “Independent Contractor Agreement” (“Agreement”). As a developer, Gilman was tasked with assisting Physna in developing software, websites, applications, and technology. Two clauses in the Agreement are at issue.

State of Ohio v. Elena Hammock 
Case #C200368
Quote from Judge Myers' Opinion:
Defendant-appellant Elena Hammock appeals the trial court’s judgment finding her in contempt of court for recording courtroom proceedings on her cellphone, sentencing her to ten days in jail, and ordering that her cellphone be confiscated and destroyed.
In two assignments of error, Hammock argues that the trial court abused its discretion both in finding that Hammock’s conduct obstructed the administration of justice under R.C. 2705.01 and in ordering the destruction of her cellphone. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Hammock’s conduct obstructed the administration of justice and that she was in contempt of court. But we hold that the court abused its discretion in ordering that Hammock’s cellphone be destroyed, as that punishment was not commensurate with the gravity of the offense, and we vacate that portion of the sentence imposed on Hammock. The judgment of the trial court is otherwise affirmed. Contemptuous Conduct
Hammock was cited by the city of Norwood for failing to remove all scrap items, litter, trash, junk, debris, garbage and other unsightly and/or unsanitary items from her property in violation of Norwood Codified Ordinance 1747.14, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. She filed a motion to dismiss her citation, and her case was transferred to the Hamilton County Municipal Court.