Quick reminder! The library will be closed on October 10th in observance of Columbus day.
State of Ohio v. Delbert Rasool
Quote from Judge Bergeron:
Officer Morehead responded to a car crash close to midnight involving Mr. Rasool. When Officer Morehead arrived, she found Mr. Rasool outside of his car, which had gone “kind of up on the grassy area off the curb.” Officer Morehead testified that the accident happened on a narrow residential street with cars parked on both sides, rendering it impossible for more than one car to pass at a time. She believed that Mr. Rasool must have hit a parked car head-on based on the resting place of his car. She never, however, asked for Mr. Rasool’s account of what happened.
Officer Morehead testified that she believed Mr. Rasool to be appreciably impaired to the point that he should not be operating a vehicle. Furthermore, according to the state, Officer Morehead observed Mr. Rasool struggling to retrieve his documents, presenting a moderate odor of alcohol, and exhibiting difficulty in following directions. She further testified that Mr. Rasool “was standing up straight and he just fell over.”
The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to suppress where the arresting officer testified inconsistently raising credibility issues as it pertained to probable cause.
State of Ohio v. Marcus Murray
Quote from Judge Winkler:
The record shows that Murray had been granted bail in the case involving two second-degree-felony offenses, felonious assault and improper discharge of firearm into a habitation. Bond eventually was set at $100,000 at ten percent. Murray posted bond on November 22, 2019, and was released.
After a series of continuances, the case was set for a jury trial on November 16, 2021. Instead of a trial on that day, the court issued an order that revoked Murray’s bond. Murray tried to flee from the courtroom, apparently in response to the bond revocation. The trial court found him in contempt and imposed a six-month jail term. The following day, defense counsel filed a motion for reinstatement of bond and requesting a full hearing on the matte r, claiming the revocation was based on the prosecuting witness’s “unsubstantiated statement” that Murray had threatened to harm her if she appeared in court. The trial court did not rule on the November 17, 2021 motion, but it did deny a January 2022 motion for reinstatement of bond in early February.
The trial court’s final order denying pretrial bail without complying with the requirements of R.C. 2937.222 was erroneous.
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED
State of Ohio v. Lonnie Wilburn
We consider this appeal on the accelerated calendar, and this judgment entry is not an opinion of the court. See Rep.Op.R. 3.1; App.R. 11.1(E); 1st Dist. Loc.R. 11.1.1. Defendant-appellant’s appointed counsel has advised this court that, after a thorough review of the record, he can find nothing that would arguably support appellant’s appeal, and that the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see also Freels v. Hills, 843 F.2d 958 (6th Cir.1988). Counsel, as required by Anders, has communicated this conclusion to appellant, and has offered appellant an opportunity to respond and to raise any issues. Counsel has also moved this court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders at 744; see also 1st Dist. Loc.R. 16.2(C)(1) and 16.2(D)(2).
FAP Properties XL, LLC v. Michael L. Griffin
Quote from Judge Bock:
In October 2020, FAP filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Griffin as trustee of the Michael L. Griffin Trust, doing business as Tint Masters (“Tint Masters”), and against Griffin and Necole Mitchell individually as guarantors (together, “defendants”). The complaint alleged that: (1) Tint Masters failed to cease its operation of its collision repair and auto body shop, which was a violation of the lease agreement; (2) Tint Masters owed FAP $15,000, the balance of the rent under the lease; (3) Griffin was a personal guarantor of Tint Masters’ obligations as the tenant, and Tint Masters was liable for physical damages and other related costs; and (4) Mitchell was also a personal guarantor of Tint Masters’ obligations. FAP attached to the complaint a copy of the parties’ lease agreement, the 30-, 15- and 3-day notices that FAP provided to Tint Masters, which stated that Tint Masters was in violation of its lease for operating a collision and body shop on the premises, and the personal guarantees signed by Griffin and Mitchell.
The trial court did not err in granting plaintiff landlord’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss defendant tenant’s counterclaims as defendant failed to show that the commercial lease was defective or that the parties modified the lease; defendant failed to show fraud as defendant did not specify what false statements were made against defendant individually; any statements made by plaintiff that defendant claimed were defamatory were made within the confines of court proceedings and, therefore, privileged; and defendant failed to show that he could prevail on his claims for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Any error committed by the trial court in holding an ex parte hearing on plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order was harmless where the court ruled in defendant’s favor.
State of Ohio v. James Edwards
Quote from Judge Crouse:
In June 2019, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment against Edwards, charging (1) burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a second-degree felony; (2) theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a third-degree felony; (3) having weapons while under disability (“WUD”), in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a thirddegree felony; (4) theft, in violation of 2913.02(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony; and (5) forgery, in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony. Edwards pled guilty to the burglary, WUD, and fourth-degree theft counts in exchange for dismissal of the third-degree theft and forgery counts.
The trial court properly imposed an indefinite sentence for a second-degree-felony offense as required by the Reagan Tokes Law, which is not unconstitutional on its face. See State v. Guyton, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190657, 2022-Ohio-2962. [See CONCURRENCE: The notice and hearing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law appear to be deficient in meeting procedural due process requirements; however, stare decisis weighs in favor of upholding the law.] [But see DISSENT: The statutory provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not provide the fundamental requirements for procedural due process, and stare decisis carries less weight when constitutional interpretation is at issue.]
State of Ohio v. Ricardo Lattimore
The court sua sponte removes this case from the regular calendar and places it on the court’s accelerated calendar, 1st Dist. Loc.R. 11.1.1(A), and this judgment entry is not an opinion of the court. See Rep.Op.R. 3.1; App.R. 11.1(E). Ricardo Lattimore appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). Lattimore was convicted after a bench trial, at which the arresting Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper and Lattimore testified. In one assignment of error, Lattimore argues his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence.
State of Ohio v. Quinnetta Thornton
C-210629, C-210630, C-210631, C-210632
Quote from Judge Bock:
In July 2021, Thornton was charged with four counts of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2929.159(A)(1), misdemeanors of the first degree. Thornton was accused of committing domestic violence against her four minor children, ages ten, eight, six, and five.
At an August 2021 jury-trial setting, the state asked for a continuance because it had discovered new evidence and one of its witnesses was not present. Thornton objected, stating that she was ready for trial and she was unable to see her children due to the temporary protection order that resulted from the domesticviolence charges. The trial court granted the continuance.